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Abstract
This paper analyzes how subjective expectations about wage opportunities influence the
job search decision. We match data on subjective wage expectations with administrative
employment records. The data reveal that unemployed individuals over-estimate their
future net re-employment wage by 10% on average. In particular, the average individual
does not anticipate that wage offers decline in value with their elapsed time out of em-
ployment. How does this optimism affect job finding? We analyze this question using
a structural job search framework in which subjective expectations about future wage
offers are not constrained to be consistent with reality. Results show that wage optimism
has highly dynamic effects: upon unemployment entry, optimism decreases job finding
by about 8%. This effect weakens over the unemployment spell and eventually switches
sign after about 8 months of unemployment. From then onward, optimism prevents un-
employed individuals from becoming discouraged and thus increases search. On average,
optimism increases the duration of unemployment by about 6.5%.
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1 Introduction
Most welfare states support unemployed workers in their search for a job. This has been
justified by the costs imposed by unemployment on both public finances and individuals’ work
careers. In particular, previous research has shown that prolonged unemployment decreases
job finding prospects (Kroft et al., 2013; Eriksson and Rooth, 2014), as well as the quality of
wage offers (Schmieder et al., 2016). These studies provide strong evidence that the returns
to job search decrease with elapsed duration in unemployment. Less knowledge exists on how
individuals perceive these returns, and how they react to their beliefs. Such knowledge is,
however, important to effectively counsel and inform unemployed individuals. Given the wide
use of counseling in modern welfare states, it is crucial to take into account beliefs held by
unemployed individuals, and to understand how these beliefs affect job search behavior.
In this paper, we focus on the expectations held by newly unemployed job seekers about
their wage prospects. We show descriptively that the average job seeker over-estimates her
future wage outcome. We then use a structural dynamic job search model to analyze how
this “wage optimism” affects the decision to search for work at different stages of the unem-
ployment spell.
The data on subjective wage expectations stem from the ‘Linked IZA/IAB Evaluation
Dataset’, which contains both survey data on subjective expectations and administrative
records on labor market histories and outcomes. In line with previous evidence (e.g., by
Schmieder et al., 2016), we observe that re-employment wages decrease over the unemployment
spell, relative to prior wages. By contrast, subjective expectations do not take account of
future reductions in the quality of wage offers. Rather, expectations are heavily anchored in
past wages. The average gap between initial expectations and actually realized re-employment
wages amounts to 10% in net terms. Even after one year out of employment, most individuals
do not update their expectations.1 These patterns reveal that unemployed individuals do not
recognize that they are searching in a highly dynamic environment.
To assess the consequences of wage optimism for job search, we introduce subjective wage
expectations into a non-stationary job search model similar to Card et al. (2007) and Frijters
and van der Klaauw (2006). In these models, unemployed workers choose their optimal job
search effort across their unemployment spell. We model individuals as holding potentially
incorrect beliefs about both the average value of wage offers and, importantly, about the
evolution of wage offers over the unemployment spell. We identify these two key parameters
using the data on subjective expectations about future wages. Additionally, we model three
sources of dynamics in the job search environment: First, the quality of the average wage
1Over-optimism by job seekers regarding future wages is consistent with evidence on the empirics of reser-
vation wages by Krueger and Mueller (2016) and Koenig et al. (2016), who find that workers persistently
misjudge their prospects and set their reservation wage according to their previous wage.
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offer can evolve over the duration out of employment. Second, search costs are allowed to
change over time, capturing the phenomenon that job seekers find it increasingly difficult to
generate job offers.2 Third, UI benefits are paid for a limited amount of time. After exhausting
UI payments, benefits are reduced to the level of social assistance. Additionally, the model
controls for observable heterogeneity in search costs and wage offers. Similar to Card et al.
(2007) and DellaVigna et al. (2017), we focus on search effort instead of reservation wage
dynamics and assume that every wage offer is accepted.3 We provide a range of estimates for
different choices of the discount rate.
We use the parameter estimates to simulate a hypothetical scenario in which individuals
are perfectly informed about the stochastic evolution of wage offers. The simulation results
show that wage optimism affects the trajectory of job search in a highly dynamic way. At
first, the knowledge about falling wage prospects creates an incentive for unemployed workers
to search more. As a consequence, having correct information about the labor market in-
creases job finding by around 8% early in an unemployment spell compared to the optimistic
benchmark. This effect weakens over the spell and eventually switches sign after about 8
months of unemployment. From then onward, the information about worsened wage offers
discourages search and thereby decreases job finding by up to 15%. Long-term unemployed
individuals thus search less when they are well-informed about the wage offers they face. As
most individuals exit during early stages of the unemployment spell, optimism prolongs the
average unemployment duration by around 0.7 months (6.5%). The amount of UI benefits
paid to the average recipient therefore increases by 450 Euros. Average accepted wages de-
crease by about 1%. Nevertheless, the dynamic pattern renders the overall implications of
wage optimism ambiguous: optimism discourages search at early stages of the spell, while
encouraging it at later stages. This qualitative pattern persists for different choices of the
discount rate, while the estimated size of the initial negative effect of optimism decreases in
the discount rate.
Our results contribute to the understanding of job search behavior in a dynamic setting
and under potentially non-rational expectations. A growing literature analyzes job search
under alternative behavioral assumptions than those made by standard models. For instance,
DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) and Paserman (2008) study job search with non-exponential
discounting. DellaVigna et al. (2017) introduce reference-dependent preferences into a job
search model, making the case for a benefit schedule in which UI benefits decrease step-wise
over the duration in unemployment. Caliendo et al. (2015) analyze job search strategies when
2See, e.g., Kroft et al. (2013) and Eriksson and Rooth (2014) for evidence that the probability of a callback
decreases over the unemployment spell.
3In line with this assumption, Schmieder et al. (2016) find that reservation wages of German job seekers
are not binding, suggesting that they are not a meaningful driver of search dynamics in the context of our
analysis.
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the subjective job offer arrival rate depends on the locus of control. They find that a more
internal locus of control is associated with higher job search effort. Spinnewijn (2015) shows
that job seekers in the U.S. are overly optimistic regarding their job finding prospects.4 He
presents theoretical evidence that optimal unemployment insurance design is affected by the
presence of biased beliefs. Arni and Wunsch (2014) observe a negative relationship between
subjective wage expectations and the exit rate out of unemployment. Altmann et al. (2017)
show that the provision of information to unemployed individuals via a brochure increases
job finding among individuals with low re-employment prospects. We add to this literature
by providing a first structural analysis of dynamic job search behavior under subjective wage
expectations: based on our model, we trace search choices over the unemployment spell and
contrast choices made by over-optimistic agents to choices made by perfectly rational agents.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents a search model with
subjective expectations about the wage offer distribution. Section 3 describes the matched
administrative and survey data. Section 4 provides reduced form evidence on wage expecta-
tions and outcomes. We describe the structural estimation in section 5 and present results in
section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
We set up a discrete-time, non-stationary job search model similar to Card et al. (2007), where
job seekers choose the level of search intensity in each period of time. In a context where wage
offers decline in value over the unemployment spell, non-stationarity is central to analyze how
subjective wage expectations affect behavior.5 We first present a rational-expectations version
of the model and then introduce the possibility of diverging subjective expectations.
In each period of time t, a worker is either employed at a job paying gross wage w, or
unemployed with unemployment benefits bt. At the beginning of each period, job seekers
determine their level of search intensity st ∈ [0, 1], which directly translates into their per-
period probability of finding a job. Upon finding a job, workers remain employed for the
entire future. As in Card et al. (2007) and DellaVigna et al. (2017), we focus on search effort
instead of reservation wage dynamics and assume that every wage offer is accepted.6 We
discuss alternative assumptions on reservation wages below.
4Evidence on persistent over-optimism also exists from other labor market contexts. Hoffman and Burks
(2017) show that truck drivers over-estimate their (future) productivity without updating their beliefs.
5Non-stationarity in job search models was formalized by Van den Berg (1990), who presents a non-
stationary job search model in continuous time.
6Schmieder et al. (2016) provide empirical evidence supporting this assumption, by showing that reservation
wages of German job seekers are not binding.
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sEFT V (w) + (1− s)Ut − ct(s), (3)
where u denotes the utility of consumption, r is the time discount rate, ct is the strictly convex
effort cost function in period t, Ft is the wage distribution of job offer arrivals in period t, and
EF designates the expectation over the wage offer distribution. The function τ denotes the
tax and transfer function, such that consumption equals the net wage τ(w). In this problem,
the job seeker’s optimal search policy is the path (st)
∞
t=1. It is determined by the first-order
conditions
c′t(st) = EFtV (w)− Ut, (4)
for t = 1, . . .. Assuming that the job search environment becomes stationary after T time







[sTEFtV (w)− cT (sT )], (5)
c′T (sT ) = EFtV (w)− UT , (6)
such that a complete solution of the model is obtained by backward induction.
Subjective Wage Expectations The proposed model of job search allows for non-stationarity
in the benefit level bt, the cost of effort ct and in the wage offer distribution Ft. As shown by
the first-order conditions (4), the wage offer distribution enters the optimal search decision
both directly through the value of finding a job today, EFtV (w), and indirectly through the
value of finding a job in the future. Therefore, the perceived evolution of the wage offer
distribution matters for search behavior. In what follows, we distinguish the objective (true)
from the subjective wage offer distributions, the latter denoted F subt (t = 1, . . .).
Definition of Wage Optimism We allow for a difference between the true wage offer
distribution and its subjective counterpart. Given the widely established evidence of optimism
as a behavioral trait, optimism with respect to the subjective wage offer distribution seems
plausible. Wage optimism can be defined as follows: denote by (Ft)
∞
t=1 the true sequence of
cumulative wage offer distributions, and allow the job seeker to face the job search problem
with subjective wage expectations (F subt )
∞




for all t ≥ 1 in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. Conversely, a job seeker is wage
pessimistic if F subt ≺ Ft for all t ≥ 1 holds.
However, we must emphasize that wage optimism as it is defined above is just one possible
deviation between subjective and true wage offer distributions. It is, for instance, conceivable
that subjective wage distributions are below the true path of wage offers for some periods and
above for others.
Consequences of Wage Optimism When individuals would display wage optimism as
defined above, this would change job search behavior in a predictable manner. To see the



















where St,t+η = (1− st) . . . (1− st+η−1). The first term on the right hand side is the expected
utility stream from unemployment benefits, conditional on the job seeker’s search behavior.
The second term is the expected value of finding a job in the future less any future effort
costs, again conditional on searching. From this equation, it becomes clear that the chosen
search intensity involves a trade-off between the current and any future value of taking up
employment.
Consider a marginal change in the perceived wage offer distribution, e.g., a wage increase
φW . The effect on the current expected value of work is ∂EF subt
V (w)/∂φW , and the effect on













This result can be used to derive qualitative predictions. First consider the case of wage
optimism in a stationary job search model. In this case, the marginal effect of the increase
in the subjectively expected wage on current and future values of employment is constant,
i.e., ∂EF subt
V (w)/∂φW = ∂EF subt+η
V (w)/∂φW for all η = 1, . . .. Therefore, the effect of wage
optimism on today’s search effort is unambiguously positive.
It is, of course, more realistic to consider a duration-dependent wage offer distribution.
The effect of optimism on search behavior is then composed of changes in both current and
future payoffs. To fix ideas, first consider the decision of how much to search at the beginning
of the unemployment spell. Optimism about current wage offers increases the incentive to
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search. Conversely, optimism about future wage offers reduces the search incentive, as the
cost of remaining unemployed is lowered. The net effect of optimism on early job search
is thus theoretically ambiguous and remains an empirical question. Considering the effect
of optimism at later stages of the unemployment spell, theory predicts that wage optimism
increases search. The intuition is that the search environment converges towards the sta-
tionary equilibrium as unemployment progresses. As described above, wage optimism under
stationarity unambiguously increases search.
The effect of wage optimism on initial job search is thus ambiguous. By contrast, theory
predicts that optimistic individuals search more at later stages in the unemployment spell,
towards the stationary period.
Learning and Reservation Wages Our model assumes that job seekers accept every wage
offer, thereby assuming that any reservation wage is not binding. This central assumption is
motivated by recent empirical evidence suggesting that reservation wages are not the main
driver of search dynamics and the job finding hazard (e.g. Card et al., 2007; Krueger and
Mueller, 2016; Schmieder et al., 2016). Given the popularity of job search models with reser-
vation wages (c.f. the surveys by Eckstein and Van den Berg, 2007; Rogerson et al., 2005), a
discussion of our modeling approach is, however, necessary.
When considering the initial periods of the unemployment spell, a model with reservation
wages leads to similar predictions as our model. The main intuition is that individuals with
optimistic wage expectations set their reservation wages too high, and potentially adjust them
downward too little over time. If reservation wages are binding, wage optimism thus leads to
an increased rejection of wage offers and therefore reduces job finding. At the initial periods
of the unemployment spell, this is in line with our model, which also predicts a reduced job
finding hazard in response to optimism. In later periods, our model implies that optimism can
also encourage search by the long-term unemployed, and thereby increase job finding. In a
model with reservation wages, this effect would be counteracted by the increased rejection of
wage offers due to optimism. We thus conclude that the two models imply similar behavioral
reactions at initial periods of the unemployment spell, but potentially diverging reactions
during later periods.
Unfortunately, we do not observe rejected offers in our data and can therefore not test for
a reservation wage policy directly. Instead, we show that individuals do not appear to learn
about wage offers, an indication that reservation wages may not be relevant (see section 4).
Finally, it is worth noting that acceptance of any wage offer is not the only possible
interpretation of the search effort model. The model may also, as in Card et al. (2007), be




Data Sources and Sampling We match administrative data on unemployed individuals
from the German IAB Employment Biographies to survey data from the IZA Evaluation
Dataset. The IZA Evaluation Dataset is a telephone survey of randomly chosen individuals
who became unemployed and received payments from the German unemployment insurance
(UI) between June 2007 and May 2008.7 The interviews are realized around 5 to 12 weeks
after entry into unemployment. We restrict the analysis to individuals aged between 20 and
55 years, who worked full-time prior to unemployment,8 were unemployed for at least one full
month and were searching for work.9 After these restrictions, 7,492 individuals are potentially
part of the sample.
To measure the relationship between pre-unemployment wages, wage expectations and
re-employment wages in a consistent way, we need to apply additional, non-standard sample
restrictions. These ensure that our picture of optimistic wage expectations is not driven by
confounding factors:
To focus on regular employment, we first exclude individuals whose net pre-unemployment
monthly wage is below 631e net, the level of social assistance (including housing benefits) for a
single household (N=1032, 13.7%). In addition, we drop individuals whose pre-unemployment
wage is top-coded by the IAB at monthly 4,470e gross (N=217, 2.9%). For these individuals,
it is impossible to infer the wage depreciation profile. We further exclude individuals whose
self-reported pre-unemployment net wage exceeds the pre-unemployment gross wage reported
in the administrative data (N=1118, 14.9%). In these cases, self-reported and administratively
reported wages are obviously inconsistent.10 This is problematic in our context, as we study
both wage expectations and re-employment wages in relation to the pre-unemployment wage.
We finally drop individuals who did not state a wage expectation although they were not
yet re-employed at the time of the survey (N=402, 5.4%).11 We do not exclude individuals
who already found a job at the time of the interview and therefore do not have a stated
expectation.12 After applying these restrictions, the estimation sample contains 4,723 job
seekers.
7Arni et al. (2014) provide a detailed description of the sampling method and content of the survey. The
merged IZA/IAB data is described by Eberle et al. (2017).
8We exclude part-time workers to avoid that changes in working hours confound the wage effects we are
interested in.
9Individuals who state that they are not searching for work are not asked for their wage expectation and
are therefore not relevant for our analysis.
10Additionally, the administrative data can under-state the actual pre-unemployment gross wage in the cases
of temporary sickness or maternity leave.
11We define an individual as re-employed when entering a job that exceeds monthly welfare benefits
(=monthly wage> 631e) and lasts longer than one month. Individuals may consider themselves as re-employed
when entering subsidized or marginal employment, and thus not answer the question on wage expectations.
12In the estimation, these individuals contribute to the likelihood of job finding, but not to the likelihood of
wage expectations.
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Measurement of Unemployment Duration and Wages The administrative data al-
low for a precise measurement of the realized unemployment duration, the pre-unemployment
and the re-employment wage, the unemployment history and unemployment benefit payments.
We observe entry into unemployment and can follow individuals until they are re-employed,
independent of whether or not they receive unemployment benefits. Information on the em-
ployment status is reported on a monthly basis. An individual is defined as re-employed when
entering a job whose wage exceeds monthly welfare benefits (631e) and which lasts longer
than one month.
Measurement of Subjective Wage Expectations The survey data are used, in partic-
ular, to measure subjective wage expectations held by job seekers at the time of the survey,
i.e., 5 to 12 weeks after entry into unemployment. The corresponding question is: “Now I am
interested in your wage expectations concerning your next job. What do you expect to earn in
net euros per month?” The wage expectation is naturally available only for job seekers who
are still searching for work at the time of the interview. 720 individuals (15.2%) had already
found a job at the time of the interview and therefore do not state a wage expectation.
For individuals who participate in the second survey wave and who are still unemployed
after one year, the data report a second wage expectation (N=628, 13.3%). This information
will be used to test for evidence of updating of expectations in both the descriptive analysis
and the structural estimation.
Reported wage expectations are stated in net terms. As individuals also state their net pre-
unemployment wage, we observe how much individuals expect to earn, in net terms, relative to
their pre-unemployment wage. In the administrative data, wages are reported in gross terms.
There, we observe how the gross re-employment wage relates to the gross pre-unemployment
wage.13 To relate gross wages to net expectations, both in the descriptive analysis and the
structural estimation, we convert gross re-employment wages into net terms according to the
procedure described in appendix A. The procedure relies on both the theoretical tax schedule
for 2008 and on the fact that we observe, for the same individual, pre-unemployment wages
in both gross and net terms.
Summary Statistics Table 1 contains summary statistics on the variables used in the
baseline estimation. The average pre-unemployment gross wage is at 1923e gross per month.
The average re-employment gross wage is 1,834e, i.e. 90e below. In turn, the average net
expectation is 120e above the average net pre-unemployment wage.
13For individuals who enter re-employment within 12 months and participate at the second survey wave, we
also observe the re-employment wage in net terms. Due to attrition and the limited time horizon, we do not




In the following, we provide descriptive evidence on the realized and perceived evolution of
wage offers after entry into unemployment. We first show that wages decrease with the time
spent in unemployment. We then document that job seekers do not expect the fall in wage
offers at the beginning of their spell, and that on average, they do not update their wage
expectations later on.
Wage Depreciation Over the Unemployment Spell Figure 1 shows how average log
monthly re-employment gross wages change with the realized duration of unemployment.
Clearly, the average wage decreases over the spell. As illustrated by Figure 2, this pattern
holds for all deciles of the wage distribution.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2]
Since wage levels may be correlated with the time spent in unemployment for various
reasons, a more relevant measure of wage depreciation results from a comparison between re-
employment and pre-unemployment wages. Figure 3 shows the same graph for the difference
between the log re-employment and the log pre-unemployment wage. The average difference
increases strongly over the spell. While individuals who remain unemployed up to 4 months
lose around 2 to 3% relative to their pre-unemployment wage, longer spells are associated
with significantly higher losses. In particular, individuals who are unemployed for longer
than one year lose 10-20% on average. According to a linear specification, the monthly
depreciation factor is −1.2%, i.e., slightly above the 0.8% estimated with local discontinuities
by Schmieder et al. (2016). Appendix figures A.2 to A.4 show the same pattern for net
wages. Tax progression slightly alleviates the wage depreciation, which is here 1% per month
according to a linear specification.
[Insert Figure 3]
Subjective Expectations of Level of Wage Offers How do individuals perceive their
wage prospects when entering unemployment? Figure 4 plots the sample distribution of the
ratio of expected over pre-unemployment net wages. Clearly, most job seekers do not expect
a wage loss. Almost 40% expect to earn a wage which is very close to their last wage, and
more individuals expect to gain than to lose relative to their pre-unemployment wage. As
illustrated by figure 5, this pattern results for many individuals in a gap between the expected
9
and the realized net re-employment wage. Both the average and the median job seeker obtain
only 90% of their expected wage.
In table A.1 of appendix B, we regress the ratio of the re-employment wage over the
expected wage on individual job seeker characteristics, to get a sense of the degree of hetero-
geneity in wage optimism. Column 1 shows that the ratio of the re-employment wage over
the expected wage decreases in the pre-unemployment wage. This suggests that individuals
with high pre-unemployment wages receive a smaller share of their expected wage. A higher
degree of education, work experience and prior unemployment experience are associated with
a more realistic expectation, i.e., with a higher ratio. The pattern also holds in column 2,
where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether the ratio of the re-employment wage
over the expected wage is lower than the sample median. While the table documents that the
degree of optimism can be very heterogeneous across individuals, we focus in this paper on
estimating the average effect of optimism on the exit from unemployment.
[Insert Figures 4 and 5]
Evolution of Subjective Wage Expectations A natural question arises: do individuals
learn? Do individuals correct for their initial optimism while searching, i.e., is there evidence
of learning over the unemployment spell? The data allow us to test for this in two ways.
First, job seekers are initially interviewed at slightly different points in their unemployment
spell, between week 5 and 12 after entry into unemployment. This provides a small degree
of random variation in the time at which job seekers are asked for their initial expectation.
Figure 6 plots the ratio of expected over last wages by the week of interview. It clearly shows
that the distribution of expectations does not change over this time window: job seekers with
5 weeks of elapsed unemployment do not hold different expectations than job seekers whose
elapsed unemployment is 12 weeks.
[Insert Figure 6]
As an additional source of variation in the timing of stated expectations, we use panel
dimension, which is available for individuals participating at the second survey wave and still
being unemployed in this period, i.e., after 12 months (N=628). Figure 7 plots the ratio
of wage expectations reported in the second wave against the initial expectation of these
individuals. It shows that more than 30% of job seekers maintain their initial expectation
after one year in unemployment. The average and median job seeker perform zero updating.
Although individuals still unemployed after a year are a selective group and despite attrition,
the pattern suggests that there is on average no relevant updating of wage expectations over
the spell. This observation is in line with reservation wage data collected by Krueger and
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Mueller (2016), who show that the reservation wages of U.S. workers hardly adapt over the
unemployment spell. Koenig et al. (2016) confirm the notion of reference dependence in
reservation wages for UK and West German job seekers. Further, Hoffman and Burks (2017)
document the absence of belief updating in a different labor market context. They show that
truck drivers over-estimate the number of miles they will run over the pay week, without
updating their beliefs over the week.
[Insert Figure 7]
5 Structural Estimation
The descriptive evidence indicates a neglect of actual wage dynamics by job seekers. From
there, we can, however, not conclude whether this mis-perception (adversely) affects individual
behavior. In the following, we want to find out whether “wage optimism” affects job search
and the duration spent in unemployment. To this end, we set up a structural analysis of job
search under subjective wage expectations.
In the following, we discuss the likelihood function, econometric specification and identifi-
cation of the model presented in section 2. Our goal is to obtain parameter estimates allowing
to simulate how search behavior changes after the imposition of perfect information on actual
wage opportunities.
5.1 Likelihood Function
We estimate the non-stationary job search model with subjective beliefs about wage offers
using maximum likelihood. The likelihood function describes the joint density of observed
wages wi, job search durations di, and wage expectations w
exp
i . The parameter vector φ con-
tains the wage offer distributions Ft, the benefit levels bt, the utility function u, as well as
the search cost function ct. We allow subjective wage expectations to be subject to measure-
ment error, with εexp ≡ log(w̃exp(φ))− log(wexp), where wexp is the reported subjective wage
expectation and w̃exp(φ) the underlying subjective wage expectation. Denote the density of
the measurement error as hexp|φ. The likelihood contribution for an uncensored observation i
















where dexpη indicates if a wage expectation is observed in period η. Similarly, for observations











Utility is logarithmic in income, implying the absence of savings as in Frijters and van der
Klaauw (2006). Individuals employed at wage w derive logarithmic utility from their net
wage, τ(w): u(w) = log(τ(w)). The conversion of gross wages into net terms follows the
procedure described in appendix A. When unemployed with benefits bt, individuals have utility
u(b) = log(bt). Unemployed agents receive wage offers from a log-normal distribution, wt ∼
N (µwt , σw), where the level of wage offers µ0 is allowed to depend on individual characteristics
X. The dependence on X is parameterized by the vector βµ, which also includes a constant
term. We suppress individual subscripts to ease notation. Over time, the mean of the wage
offer distribution depreciates at rate θobj ,




As in Paserman (2008) and DellaVigna et al. (2017), we assume the search cost function






eX − θet). (14)
The search cost component et is allowed to vary with individual characteristics X, which
is parametrized by βe (including a constant term). et can evolve geometrically with time,
as measured by the cost-depreciation factor θe. For instance, search can become more costly
over the unemployment spell, because easily available offers become exhausted or because
motivation decreases. Other elements of duration dependence, not contained in the other
model parameters, may also enter θe.
As noted by DellaVigna et al. (2017), the search cost parameter γ is the inverse elasticity
of the search intensity to the net value of unemployment, (EF subt
V (w)−Ut)/et. Both for wage
offers and for search costs, the vector of observable characteristics X includes the last wage
received before entrance into unemployment (in addition to gender, education, as well as prior
work and unemployment experience). These control for differences in ability or productivity,
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which may cause selection into prolonged unemployment. We discuss the role of unobserved
heterogeneity below, in section 5.3.
5.2.1 Subjective Wage Expectations
The survey data report subjective net wage expectations wexpt at different points early in
the unemployment spell (between week 5 and 12). Some individuals also report a second
subjective wage expectation after about 12 months of unemployment. Formally, we interpret












where d is the duration of unemployment and St,t+η(φ) = Prob(d ≥ t + η|d ≥= t, φ) is the
survival probability from t to t+η, given the model parameters φ. F subt denotes the subjective
wage offer distribution at time t characterized by N (µw,subt , σw), where
µw,subt = µ0 − θ
subt+ αsub. (17)
In this specification, an individual’s subjective wage distribution may differ from the true
wage offer distribution in two regards. First, there may be a different perception of the rate
at which mean wage offers depreciate during the unemployment spell, i.e., θsub 6= θobj . Second,
there may be a misperception of the overall level of wage offers, such that αsub 6= 0. Thus,
wage optimism may be characterized by θsub < θobj , or αsub > 0, or both.
We assume that the measurement error of the wage expectation is normally distributed,
i.e., εexp,t ∼ N (0, σexp).
5.3 Identification
The central parameters in our job search model are the rate of wage depreciation θobj and
its subjective counterpart θsub, as well as the level parameter of wage optimism αsub. Since
the model abstracts from reservation wage choices,14 we identify the full path of wage offer
distributions F objt , hence θ
obj and σw, from accepted wages at different job search durations
t. This naturally also holds for all combinations of the vector X, such that βµ is identified as
well. The parameters of the subjective counterparts of the wage distribution, denoted by θsub
14Cf. section 2 for a discussion of this modeling choice.
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and αsub, are identified by the (repeated) observations of the subjective wage expectations for
different duration outcomes.
In the model, the job finding effort depends on the net value of employment, (Vt−Ut)/et,
and the costs of search, ct(st). The optimal level of search given the net value of unemployment
is defined by st = ((Vt −Ut)/et)
1/γ . We identify βe from the scale of the hazard function and
the differences between subgroups defined by X. Furthermore, γ determines how sensitive
the hazard function is to time-varying unemployment benefits. It follows that for groups of
individuals with the same benefit path and observable characteristics, duration dependence
in the job finding hazard identifies the parameter of search cost dynamics θe.
We include past wages as a component of the vector of covariates X to control for hetero-
geneity between individuals in the average wage offer µw and in the cost of effort parameter
e. In the context of job search, controls for the labor market history have been shown to be
a powerful tool to control for (usually unobserved) heterogeneity between unemployed indi-
viduals (see, e.g., Caliendo et al., 2017, who for the data used in this paper). We, however,
acknowledge that we cannot fully exclude the possibility of remaining unobserved heterogene-
ity. Such heterogeneity would mostly lead to an over-estimation of θe, which is identified from
duration dependence conditional on X.
Following the estimates obtained by Frijters and van der Klaauw (2006) for German indi-
viduals, set the discount rate to 20% p.a., which is equivalent to a monthly discount rate of
r = 1.53%. In our setting, it is difficult to disentangle the parameter values of γ and r, since
both respond to variation in individual benefit and wage and benefit paths over the spell.
As in Frijters and van der Klaauw (2006), we assume that job finding is an absorbing state,
motivating the relatively high baseline discount rate of 20 %. To assess the sensitivity of our
policy effects with respect to the chosen discount rate, we provide results based on estimations
with r=0.01 and r=0.02, as lower and upper bounds, respectively, in section 6.3.2.
6 Estimation Results
We first report parameter estimates and the fit of the job search model with subjective wage
expectations. We then use the estimates of the subjective expectations model to simulate
a scenario in which individuals are perfectly informed about their wage prospects. On this
basis, we discuss the effect of wage optimism on the duration to re-employment, re-employment
wages, and UI benefit payments.
6.1 Parameter Estimates
Table 2 shows parameter estimates based on the likelihood specified by equations 9 and 10,
where the discount rate is set to r = 1.53% per month. The mean subjective wage expecta-
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tion for period t, µw,subt , is composed of the average initial wage level, µ0, the level difference
between expected and actual wage offers, αsub, and the subjective wage depreciation factor,
θsub (cf. equation 17). Results show that, as expected, the average re-employment wage µ0
increases in the pre-unemployment wage and education, and is lower for females. Conditional
on these variables, work experience and unemployment experience have no significant influ-
ence. The level parameter of wage optimism, αsub, indicates that job seekers over-estimate
their future re-employment wage level by 7% on average. The estimated subjective wage offer
depreciation rate, θsub, is not different from zero, implying that individuals do not anticipate
their wage offers to fall. The actual wage depreciation factor, θobj , is estimated to be 1.2%
per month of unemployment. Therefore, individuals are on average wage optimistic both with
respect to the wage offer level, and with respect to its depreciation.
Search costs increase in pre-unemployment wages and are about 35% higher for female job
seekers. The estimate of θe suggests that search costs increase by about 37% per month of
unemployment. This is in line with the intuition that job seekers have increasing difficulties
in generating job offers.
[Insert Table 2]
6.2 Model Fit
Figures 8 to 10 illustrate how the model fits the data. They plot model predictions based on
1,000 independent random draws for each of the 4,723 individuals in the sample, using the
parameter estimates reported in table 2.
As shown by figure 8, job finding exhibits strong negative duration dependence in the data.
The job finding hazard starts out from about 15 to 17% and declines to as little as 3% after
20 months. This pattern is well captured by the model. Figures 9 to 10 show histograms for
the fit of gross re-entry wages and net wage expectations, respectively. Both wage measures
are well predicted by the model.
[Insert Figures 8 to 10]
6.3 Simulation: The Effects of Wage Optimism on Job Finding
We now quantify the impact of wage optimism on job finding. To this end, use the parameter
estimates to simulate a scenario in which individuals are perfectly informed about future
wage offers. We first report baseline results and then assess how sensitive the results are with
respect to the choice of the discount factor. All simulations are based on 1,000 independent




To understand how wage optimism affects job finding, we simulate a counter-factual scenario
in which job seekers are fully aware of the path of wage offers over the progression of un-
employment. To this end, we estimate the subjective expectations model while imposing
αsub = 0 and θsub = θobj . In terms of policy, we predict the effects of an intervention in
which the average job seeker is provided with perfect information about their wage profiles.
We simulate a policy that leads to a full adjustment of individual wage expectations to ac-
tual wage offer distributions. This is, of course, an ideal that is unlikely reached in practice.
However, well-designed counseling, or an “information treatment” will likely lead to a partial
adjustment of subjective wage expectations. Therefore, we use our simulation results to un-
derstand the dynamic reactions of job search to optimism, and to measure an upper bound
on the potential effect of information provision.
We contrast the effect of information provision with the effect of a 10% reduction in search
costs et in each month t of the spell. From a policy perspective, search costs can for instance
be reduced by offering support with application writing or by referring suitable vacancies.
[Insert Figure 11]
Figure 11 plots predicted percentage changes in the job finding hazard over the spell. In
line with intuition, the search cost reduction has unambiguously positive effects on job finding.
Given that search costs increase over the spell (due to a positive estimate of θe), the benefits
of a 10% cost reduction also follow a slightly increasing pattern. Overall, job-finding increases
by around 2-3%.
By contrast, the information treatment shows highly dynamic effects over the course of the
unemployment spell. As wage losses can be avoided by exiting at an earlier stage, perfectly
informed individuals are around 8% more likely to find a job during the first month of unem-
ployment. This effect sharply decreases over the spell and reaches a point estimate of zero in
month seven. From then onward, perfect information reduces incentives to search and the job
finding probability decreases by up to 15% in month 20. This simulated pattern sheds light
on the qualitative predictions discussed in section 2: at the beginning of the unemployment
spell, the prospect of falling wage offers creates an incentive to search more today. Under
wage optimism, this incentive is absent, which explains that the counter-factual with perfect
information predicts more individuals finding a job very early on. For individuals who remain
unemployed, rational expectations reduce the motivation to search: informed individuals now
realize that they have lower returns from searching, since the quality of their wage offers has
depreciated.
In table 3, we report how the change to perfect information affects the average duration
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of unemployment, the amount of benefit payments and wages. Given that a large share of in-
dividuals exits unemployment at early stages, the average duration to re-employment reduces
substantially in response to the provision of information, by about 0.7 months (≈ 6.5%). As
a consequence, benefit payments per person fall by around 452e (≈ 6%) per person. As the
average individual avoids nearly one month of wage depreciation, the average re-employment
wage increases by about 1%. The 10% search cost reduction reduces unemployment and
benefit payments by about 2% and increases wages by about 0.1%.
[Insert Table 3]
Taken together, the simulation illustrates an economically significant potential to increase
early job finding by raising the awareness about falling wage offers. This benefit, however,
comes at the price of discouragement among long-term unemployed workers, rendering overall
policy implications ambiguous.
6.3.2 Sensitivity to the Chosen Discount Factor
As evoked in section 5.3, the estimated returns to information may be influenced by the chosen
discount factor r. Setting r too low may lead us to over-estimate the effect of information
provision on job finding: more patient job seekers find a decrease in future wage offers more
salient, such that initial job search shows stronger reactions to future wage offer reductions.
Setting the discount rate too high has the opposite effect of under-estimating the role of
information provision. By contrast, the estimated effect on search at later stages of the spell
is unlikely to be affected, as it is mostly driven by changes in current payoffs.
To provide evidence on the sensitivity of predicted effects to the discount factor, we esti-
mate the effect of optimism for a low value of r = 1%, and for a high value of r = 2%. The
corresponding parameter estimates are reported in tables A.2 and A.3 of appendix C. Figure
12 shows that the qualitative pattern of the policy effect looks very similar across discount
factors. However, the initial effect sizes vary: for the lower bound of r = 1%, the initial
increase in the job finding hazard due to information starts off at around 12% and becomes
zero only in month 11. This reflects that patient individuals initially perceive future wage
losses as being more salient. In turn, the effects simulated with the upper bound of 2% are
only slightly more negative than those from the baseline with r ≈ 1.5%. The effect of the
information treatment for longer-term unemployed (12+ months) does not depend on the
chosen discount rate. This is expected, as the decision to search is less influenced by future
payoffs when the stationary period approaches.
Given that job finding predominantly occurs at the beginning of a spell, the size of average
effects reacts to the choice of r. As reported in table 4, the duration in unemployment is
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predicted to decrease by 10% for r = 1%, compared to an increase by 6.5% in the baseline
case with r = 1.53% and an increase by 5% for r = 2%.
We conclude that the exact initial effect sizes are sensitive to the choice of the discount
factor. However, we can confirm the robustness of the following findings. First, the potential
effect of information about wage opportunities on job finding is economically significant.
Second, the effect is initially positive and switches signs later in the spell. It is in our setting
unambiguously positive in the first six months, and unambiguously negative for spells lasting
longer than a year.
[Insert Figure 12 and Table 4]
7 Conclusion
We combine data on subjective expectations with data on realized job search outcomes. We
show that job seekers significantly over-estimate their future wage outcomes, by 10% on
average.
We build a structural job search model that accounts for the divergence of subjective
beliefs from the true wage offer distribution. Based on simulations of a counter-factual with
perfect information, we find that wage optimism increases the average unemployment dura-
tion by around 0.7 months (6.5%). However, this average effect masks important dynamics:
more information leads individuals to increase their search effort over the first few months
of unemployment. During this time, the information about future reductions in job offer
quality raises the incentive to search for a job. For longer-term unemployed individuals, who
are already affected by deteriorated wage offers, information lowers the search incentive and
therefore reduces job finding. This implies a cautionary note for efforts aimed at informing
job seekers better about the dynamics of their job search environment: care needs to be taken
not to discourage the long-term unemployed.
Finally, our study suggests an easy-to-implement test for potential mis-specification in
dynamic job-search models: combining the use of actually observed declines in wage offers
with the assumption of a static subjective wage offer distribution, to account for the fact that
individuals do not anticipate the depreciation of wages. This procedure can serve as a useful
robustness check for policy simulations based on search models whenever data on subjective
wage expectations is not available.
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8 Figures
Figure 1: Re-Employment Log Wage (Gross)















Source: IAB Employment Biographies. The shaded area shows 95% confidence bands. The graph includes
individuals who enter re-employment within 20 months (N=3,592).
Figure 2: Deciles of Re-Employment Log Wage (Gross)




















P 20 P 30 P 40
P 50 P 60 P 70
P 80
Source: IAB Employment Biographies. The graph includes individuals who enter re-employment within
20 months (N=3,592).
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Figure 3: Re-Employment Minus Pre-Unemployment Log Wage (Gross)


























Source: IAB Employment Biographies. The shaded area shows 95% confidence bands. The graph includes
individuals who enter re-employment within 20 months (N=3,592).
Figure 4: Initial Wage Expectation over Pre-Unemployment Wage (Net)











Source: IAB Employment Biographies (pre-unemployment wage) and IZA Evaluation Dataset (wage ex-
pectation). The graph includes individuals who have not entered re-employment at the interview date
(N=4,005). Individuals with a ratio larger than 3 are excluded from the graph (<1%)
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Figure 5: Re-Employment Wage over Wage Expectation (Net)











Source: IAB Employment Biographies (re-employment wage) and IZA Evaluation Dataset (wage expecta-
tion). The graph includes individuals who have not entered re-employment at the interview date and who
enter re-employment within 20 months (N=2,874).
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Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset. The graph shows box plots on initial (log) net wage expectations over
the job seeker’s week of interview. The upper line of the box shows 75th percentiles, the line inside the box
shows medians and the lower line shows 25th percentiles. Dots show outside values. The graph includes
individuals who have not entered re-employment at the interview date (N=4,005).
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Figure 7: Net Wage Expectation in Wave 1 over Net Wage Expectation in Wave 2











Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset. Wave 1 takes place between 5 and 11 weeks after entry into unemploy-
ment. Wave 2 re-interviews all available job seekers after 12 months of unemployment. The graph includes
individuals with a stated wage expectation in waves 1 and 2 (N=628).
Figure 8: Fit of Job Finding Hazard






















Predictions are made based on the parameter estimates reported in table 2.
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Figure 9: Fit of Re-Employment Wages
















Predictions are based on 1,000 independent random draws for each of the 4,723 individuals in the sample, using the
parameter estimates reported in table 2.
Figure 10: Fit of Subjective Wage Expectations













Predictions are based on 1,000 independent random draws for each of the 4,723 individuals in the sample, using the
parameter estimates reported in table 2.
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Figure 11: Simulation: Effect of Information Provision and Search Cost Reduction


























The counter-factual simulations are based on 1,000 independent random draws for each of the 4,723 individuals in
the sample. The information treatment imposes perfect information about wage offers by setting αsub = 0 and
θsub = θobj . The simulated search cost reduction reduces et by 10% at each month of the spell.
Figure 12: Simulation: Effect of Information Provision for Different Discount Factors


























The counter-factual simulations are based on 1,000 independent random draws for each of the 4,723 individuals
in the sample. The information provision imposes perfect information about wage offers by setting αsub = 0 and
θsub = θobj .
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9 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Data Source
UE Duration 4,723 8.891 7.373 Admin
Censored at T=20 4,723 0.239 0.427 Admin
Gross Pre-UE Wage 4,723 1923.125 744.296 Admin
Net Pre-UE Wage 4,723 1261.724 420.055 Survey
Gross Re-Employment Wage 3,592 1834.001 718.793 Admin
Net Re-Employment Wage 3,592 1227.857 434.990 Admin, own calculation
Net Expected Wage, Wave 1 4,005 1380.496 461.211 Survey
Net Expected Wage, Wave 2 628 1364.229 456.119 Survey
Education: Medium 4,723 0.487 0.500 Survey
Education: High 4,723 0.177 0.381 Survey
Female 4,723 0.387 0.487 Survey
UE in Prev 10 Yrs (Yes/No) 4,723 0.712 0.453 Admin
Work Experience > Median 4,723 0.566 0.496 Admin
PBD in Months 4,723 11.318 2.269 Own calculation
UI Benefits (ALG I) 4,723 819.803 242.820 Admin
Welfare Benefits (ALG II) 4,723 631 0 Own calculation
Source: IZA Evaluation Dataset (survey) & IAB Employment Biographies (admin). An exit from unem-
ployment is defined as the transition to a job which is exceeds welfare benefits (631 euros per month) and
lasts more than one month. Right-censoring applies if individuals are unemployed for more than 20 months.
Wages are reported in monthly terms. “Education: Medium” takes the value one if the individual has fin-
ished the German Realschule or Fachoberschule. “Education: High” takes the value one if the individual
holds the German Abitur. Prior unemployment and work experience both refer to the 10 years prior to
entry into the current unemployment spell. The median work experience level over this period is 5 years.
PBD is a function of the number of months worked during the 5 years prior to unemployment, and of age.
UI benefits are a function of the pre-unemployment wage and of the number of children. Welfare benefits
are means-tested and contain a payment for rent expenses and a payment for other living expenses. In
practice, welfare benefits vary with household size. For simplification, we use here the average payment for
a single individual.
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Log Pre-UE Wage 0.599 0.005
Education: Medium 0.023 0.007
Education: High 0.178 0.008
Female -0.101 0.006
Work Experience > Median -0.012 0.006









Log Pre-UE Wage 0.696 0.212
Education: Medium -0.102 0.157
Education: High 0.251 0.208
Female 0.353 0.173
Work Experience > Median -0.179 0.152
UE in Prev. 10 Yrs (Yes/No) -0.124 0.151
θe 0.369 0.053
Variance Parameters
SD of Log Wage Offers σw 0.305 0.003
SD of Log Wage Expectations σǫ 0.245 0.001
Average Log L -2.678
N 4,723
Estimates are based on the likelihood specified by equations 9 and 10. The discount rate is set to r =
0.0153. “Education: Medium” takes the value one if the individual has finished the German Realschule or
Fachoberschule. “Education: High” takes the value one if the individual holds the German Abitur. Prior
work and unemployment experience both refer to the 10 years prior to entry into the current unemployment
spell. The median work experience level over this period is 5 years.
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Table 3: Simulated Average Effects of Information Provision and Search Cost Reduction
Information Provision Search Cost Reduction
Simulated Effect % Change Simulated Effect % Change
Duration of UE in Months -0.7 -6.5% -0.2 -1.7%
UI Benefit Payment in Euros -452.8 -5.9% -118.9 -1.5%
Monthly Gross Wage in Euros 12.2 0.7% 1.6 0.1%
The counter-factual simulations are based on 1,000 random independent draws for each of the 4,723 indi-
viduals in the sample. The information provision imposes perfect information about wage offers by setting
αsub = 0 and θsub = θobj . The search cost reduction decreases et by 10% at each month of the spell.
Table 4: Simulated Average Effects of Information Provision, for Different Discount Factors
r=1% r=1.53% (Baseline) r=2%
Effect % Change Effect % Change Effect % Change
Duration of UE in Months -1.1 -10.3% -0.7 -6.5% -0.5 -4.8%
UI Benefit Payment in Euros -728.7 -9.5% -452.8 -5.9% -334.3 -4.3%
Monthly Gross Wage in Euros 14.5 0.8% 12.1 0.7% 10.4 0.6%
The counter-factual simulations are based on 1,000 random independent draws for each of the 4,723 indi-
viduals in the sample. The information provision imposes perfect information about wage offers by setting




To convert gross re-employment wages into net terms, we exploit two main sources: (i) the
theoretical tax schedule for 2008 and (ii) the fact that we observe pre-unemployment wages
both in gross terms (administrative data) and in net terms (survey data).
We use a functional form similar to the ones by Heathcote et al. (2014) and Blundell et al.
(2016) to approximate the theoretical relationship between gross pre-unemployment wages
prei and net pre-unemployment wages τ(pre)i:
̂τ(pre)i = β̂
∗pre1−µi , (18)
where 1−µ describes the curvature of the tax function, i.e., its progressivity. We proceed
in two steps. We first obtain µ=0.16 from the theoretical schedule governing the income
taxation of a single individual in 2008. We then relate net to gross pre-unemployment wages
using equation 18. The function fits the data remarkably well, with an R2 of 0.97. Figure
A.1a presents the relationship between prei and ̂τ(pre)i, and figure A.1b the relationship
between the predicted ̂τ(pre)i and the τ(pre)i observed in the survey data. We interpret the
%-deviation of τ(pre)i from ̂τ(pre)i as a result of taxation rules applying to the individual’s




We assume that the individual-specific rules still apply after the unemployment spell, and
measure individual i’s net re-employment wage τ(w)i as:
τ(w)i = τ̂(w)i +Devi × τ̂(w)i, (19)
where τ̂(w)i = β̂
∗w1−µi is the theoretical net gross re-employment wage, with β̂ estimated
from equation 18.
Figure A.1: Pre-Unemployment Wages: Gross, Predicted Net and Net
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B Additional Descriptive Evidence
Figure A.2: Re-Employment Log Wage (Net)

















Source: IAB Employment Biographies. Gross wages are converted into net terms according to the pro-
cedure described in appendix A. The shaded area shows 95% confidence bands. The graph includes
individuals who enter re-employment within 20 months (N=3,642).
Figure A.3: Deciles of Re-Employment Log Wage (Net)
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Source: IAB Employment Biographies. Gross wages are converted into net terms according to the proce-
dure described in appendix A. The graph includes individuals who enter re-employment within 20 months
(N=3,642).
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Figure A.4: Re-Employment Minus Pre-Unemployment Log Wage (Net)

























Source: IAB Employment Biographies. ross wages are converted into net terms according to the procedure
described in appendix A. The shaded area shows 95% confidence bands. The graph includes individuals
who enter re-employment within 20 months (N=3,642).
Table A.1: Wage Optimism and Individual Characteristics
Ratio Re-Employment/Expected Wage 1(Ratio < Median)
(1) (2)




Education: Medium 0.017∗ -0.033
(0.010) (0.021)
Education: High 0.039∗∗ -0.067∗∗
(0.015) (0.029)
Work Experience > Median 0.036∗∗∗ -0.038∗
(0.011) (0.020)
UE in Prev. 10 Yrs (Yes/No) 0.025∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.022)
Outcome Mean 0.906 0.476
N 2874 2874
The sample includes individuals with an observed wage expectation, re-entering employment within the
observation period (20 months). “Education: Medium” takes the value one if the individual has finished
the German Realschule or Fachoberschule. “Education: High” takes the value one if the individual holds the
German Abitur. Individuals in the baseline category hold a lower level of education. Prior unemployment
and work experience both refer to the 10 years prior to entry into the current unemployment spell. The
median work experience level over this period is 5 years. Robust standard errors. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p <
0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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C Additional Parameter Estimates





Log Pre-UE Wage 0.592 0.008
Education: Medium 0.027 0.007
Education: High 0.184 0.008
Female -0.099 0.006
Work Experience > Median -0.011 0.007









Log Pre-UE Wage 0.690 0.216
Education: Medium -0.093 0.162
Education: High 0.255 0.212
Female 0.396 0.218
Work Experience > Median -0.181 0.155
UE in Prev. 10 Yrs (Yes/No) -0.143 0.156
θe 0.367 0.107
Variance Parameters
SD of Log Wage Offers σw 0.305 0.003
SD of Log Wage Expectations σǫ 0.246 0.001
Average Log L -2.677
N 4,723
Estimates are based on the likelihood specified by equations 9 and 10. “Education: Medium” takes the
value one if the individual has finished the German Realschule or Fachoberschule. “Education: High” takes
the value one if the individual holds the German Abitur. Prior work and unemployment experience both
refer to the 10 years prior to entry into the current unemployment spell. The median work experience level
over this period is 5 years.
33





Log Pre-UE Wage 0.601 0.005
Education: Medium 0.025 0.007
Education: High 0.183 0.008
Female -0.097 0.006
Work Experience > Median -0.012 0.006









Log Pre-UE Wage 0.690 0.206
Education: Medium -0.106 0.157
Education: High 0.248 0.204
Female 0.338 0.171
Work Experience > Median -0.177 0.149
UE in Prev. 10 Yrs (Yes/No) -0.118 0.149
θe 0.368 0.058
Variance Parameters
SD of Log Wage Offers σw 0.306 0.003
SD of Log Wage Expectations σǫ 0.246 0.001
Average Log L -2.678
N 4,723
Estimates are based on the likelihood specified by equations 9 and 10. “Education: Medium” takes the
value one if the individual has finished the German Realschule or Fachoberschule. “Education: High” takes
the value one if the individual holds the German Abitur. Prior work and unemployment experience both
refer to the 10 years prior to entry into the current unemployment spell. The median work experience level
over this period is 5 years.
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